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There are a number of ideal threads linking the papers
collected in this remarkable book in honor of Domenico Mario
Nuti. As usual the reviewer, who is simply a supposedly more
careful and better informed reader, discovers and selects what are
— according to his/her personal judgment — the most intriguing
and relevant issues emerging from the text: but other readers will
no doubt find other ones, maybe more crucial for them (and
possibly for the authors themselves!).
First, this book provides guidelines for an economic account
and interpretation of the “Short Century” that started with the
burst of World War I and elapsed with the end of USSR in 1991.
As it is well known, those definition and time span are due to
Hobsbawm (1994) and — controversial as they are — have become
popular as a description of an age of hard global war, both hot
and cold. An age when ideology was a strong, though not unique,
motivation moving governments and peoples to fight against each
others. In this regard, the title of this book could have been
“Transition (and Before) and Beyond”, because it contains a
toolbox for understanding what happened in the Short Economic
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Century, how it happened, and where did things go afterwards. And
it is interesting to notice that one of Hobsbawm’s reference author
for the economic history of that age, Alec Nove, has also been
Mario Nuti’s co-author. After the Short Century has passed away,
the economic controversies that have animated it for decades have
soon been neglected by a large part of the economic profession —
which in turn has been captured by subsequent historic trends
(globalization, the rise and fall of worldwide democratization,
global terrorism, climate change).1 While it is reasonable, and even
a sign of vitality of the profession, that economists became involved
with other research agendas, some of the contributors to this book
(above all, Ellman and Popov) remind us that some of the lessons
of the Short Century are useful today as well. Other contributors
focus on an individual country’s transition experience and legacy
(above all, Uvalic on Serbia and Desai on Russia), and help us
understanding the specific pattern followed by some of the entities
re-emerged from those peculiar confederations of states named
Yugoslavia and USSR, where national identities have been
concealed — but not eliminated — for decades. 
A careful understanding of the legacy of Socialism is required
also to get rid of some popular tales on post-1989 Central Eastern
Europe, for example that their human capital endowment was very
high and comparable to that of Western Europe. Commander’s essay
on “Skills and the Transition” argues that this is indeed a tale far
from reality, as those apparently high educational attainments were
of lower quality than usually retained, and decreased very rapidly
as a consequence of both low investment rates in education, and a
rapidly changing demand for skills after the transition. Human
capital in Central Eastern Europe was often highly sector-specific,
due to the requirements of the planning office, as I had the chance
to discover in Latvia in 1994 where most of the Central Bank officers
were physicists, due to the peculiar role of that country in the
military-industrial Combinat of the USSR.
As pieces of an economic interpretation of the Short Century,
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA GENNAIO-FEBBRAIO 2008
356
1 For instance, a recent collection of outstanding essays of New Comparative
Economic History (HATTON T.J. - O’ROURKE K.H., 2007) does not contains a chapter
on the Socialist experience.
the essays in this volume contribute also to the ongoing (and
extremely trendy!) debate on the relationship and balance among
market, rules and (political) power. This is, of course, a debate as
old as Economics, but it has been revived recently in the aftermath
of the “Short Globalization Golden Age” of 1991-2001, when the
marriage of capitalism and democracy had appeared to many as
an unavoidable destiny for mankind, the economic counterpart of
the “End of History” evoked by a renowned historian. Other
scholars, some of them contributing to this volume, argue instead
that — far from ending — history is currently reproducing some
patterns that emerged in the early Short Century (see for instance
the close resemblance of some aspects of financial restructuring
and exchange rate policy in Central Europe in the 1920’s and
today, as suggested by De Cecco). Or, as argued by Kolodko, that
new economic arrangements and emerging conflicts (social,
environmental, and so on) are currently exposing the world
economy to new crises that push the End of History into an
indefinite future.
What we are currently observing, instead, is a resurgence of
economic nationalism after the Globalization Decade, which
means that the world economy is far from becoming seamless not
only for mere geographical or technological reasons, but for po-
litical ones above all. The Nation is back as a strong (the
strongest?) economic concept, although difficult to define proper-
ly, as it was before War World II. On the contrary, the Nation had
apparently faded away in the mythical age dominated by multi-
national corporations, multilateral organizations, international
trade unions, and so forth (of course, those entities are alive and
sometimes well). 
Some lessons from the past balances (and unbalances) of
markets, political power, bureaucracies and rules in the Short
Century and after Transition, are extremely welcome today,
because they help us understand the historical reality of concepts
we are too often accustomed to use automatically.2 In this respect,
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2 As done, in a different field, by the controversial book of CANFORA L. (2006)
on the history of democracy.
Godoy’s and Stiglitz’s critique of the advantages of “shock
therapies” (sudden liberalization and early, extended privatization)
as a trigger of fast growth in transition economies, is worth
especially because it can be included in a broader research effort
on the sequencing of economic and political reform. On different
grounds, for instance, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) have argued
that early political liberalization can be counterproductive as it
allows for the consolidation of lobbies that prevent subsequent
economic liberalizations, but see Robinson (2005) for a broader
overview of the complex relationship between democracy and
development.
This is already much, but this book has even more to offer.
Another strong message concerns the limits of economic, and
economists’, understanding of the real social process. In this
regard, it is useful to read Ellman’s essay on the rise and fall of
socialist planning, in conjunction with Tanzi’s chapter on
complexity and systemic failure. Ellman provides a short but
illuminating account of the historical path of socialist economies
dung the XX century, stressing that three factors mainly accounted
for their failure. These are: partial ignorance of the economic
environment, especially due to the distorted incentives of those
units whose data flow had to be incorporated into the plan;
inadequate data processing of the growing amount of information
generated by the system; and the increasing complexity of societies
moving from agricultural and subsistence toward industrial
economies. A relevant role in the failure of the planning experience
is due, in Ellman’s perspective, to the perverse action of
bureaucracies, both at the high level of the Gosplan office and at
the low level of the individual productive units.
Interestingly Tanzi, in his remarkable essay, not only broadly
agrees with Ellman’s view of the failure of socialist economies; he
also adds an original interpretation of the consequences of com-
plexity for market economies and economic policies. Technologi-
cal and financial complexity is getting so high in current societies,
that even skilled and informed analysts can find it difficult to trace
the sequence of causes and consequences leading to specific
events, above of all crises. Hence, the roots of both the Columbia
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shuttle tragedy and the Enron bankrupt becomes obscure, and the
steps needed to prevent subsequent failures become highly con-
troversial. The current Western financial crisis, its background of
bad monitoring and increasing complexity of investment markets,
and its aftermath of very costly public intervention, make Tanzi’s
words extremely relevant. In his view, today’s complexity exposes
market economies to the risk of not fulfilling both the equity and
the efficiency standards a politically viable economic system
should in principle guarantee: the same standards socialist plan-
ning proved unable to fulfill during the Short Century. Economic
policy in contemporaneous markets is limited in its action by a
limited and incomplete knowledge of its targets and instruments,
ex ante, and of its actual results, ex post. Complexity makes the
exercise of unregulated private power (economic, political, and of
the media) easier as it creates a deeper veil of ignorance about
the conditions of agents and social bodies; and as it multiplies the
opportunities for lobbing, corruption and opportunistic behaviors.
Growing income inequality in Western societies would call for
more economic policy, but the latter often proves ineffective: the
lesson we should get, Tanzi argues, is that “transparency and sim-
plicity should become driving principles for policy-makers in mar-
ket economies”. Nothing further away from what we are current-
ly observing.
The current, disruptive financial crisis is raising doubts on
some apparently well-grounded views on the working of capitalism
and modern finance. In general, the interaction between surplus
and deficit agents can be carried out either by markets, where
firms obtain finance directly from savers, or by financial
intermediaries, that absorb excess saving from one sector and
channel it to another one with excess investment. The first case
describes a market-oriented system, the second case describes a
bank-oriented system. In the past, there has been wide consensus
that, in the early stages of economic development, the saving
allocation function is best carried out by banks. Such a view rests
on the peculiarities of (traditional) banks.
When the economic system presents low levels of complexity,
banks are especially fit to carry out the transformation of
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maturities, by issuing liabilities with a degree of liquidity higher
than that of the assets they hold: hence they satisfy both small
investors’ demand for short-term assets and firms’ demand for
long-term liabilities. Traditional banks used to perform this
function efficiently, by managing large portfolios and therefore
being able to face the insolvency risk of individual debtors and,
at the same time, diversify maturities. In so doing, banks bear
limited return and liquidity risks. Furthermore, to the extent that
in the early phases of development markets are still partially
developed, financial intermediation can be very effective in
lowering transactions costs. In fact, in the early development
stages (traditional) banking systems may result more convenient
than direct finance as long as intermediaries can exploit both
economies of scale in attracting firms’ liabilities subscribers and
economies of scope, by supplying a wide range of activities and
services.
This point has been originally developed by Gerschenkron
(1962), in discussing the relevant role played by banks in the
industrial development of Germany and Italy at the end of the
nineteenth century, when they carried out the key function of
transferring funds from savers to investors (firms). Gerschenkron
focused on the role of banks’ very large investments in supporting
German steel industry’s development in the second half of the
nineteenth century. He also noted that support was not limited to
the supply of loans but it included banks’ direct or indirect
participation to firms venture capital (universal banks). 
According to Gerschenkron, however, this latter role was
temporary and justified by the backward conditions of the
economy. Once the economy has reached a higher degree of
complexity, investors can diversify their risk without necessarily
resorting to banks. Transaction costs lower thanks to technological
progress and the issue of the most appropriate financial system
emerges. At least four alternative approaches to Gerschenkron’s
view were developed since the 1960’s.
First, the so-called “new view approach” drawing on Gurley
and Shaw (1960), that attributes to markets and non-bank agents
a prominent role in the long-term. Second, the asymmetric
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information approach (see Diamond, 1984) that instead considers
banks as the most suitable engine of economic growth even in the
long run. 
Third, the historical-institutional approach, that criticizes the
deterministic assumptions of the previous approaches by pointing
out that the choice of the proper financial system depends on the
existing historical and institutional framework. For instance, Allen
(1993) argues that the superiority of either a market-oriented or
a bank-oriented financial structure depends on how firms are
managed. When the production possibility set is known and
management decisions can be easily evaluated, bank-oriented
financial systems prevail. Whenever, instead, uncertainty about the
production function generates uncertainty on the evaluation of
management decisions, market-oriented financial systems prevail.
Therefore, the advantage of a system depends on the amount and
the complexity of information to be taken into consideration in
the decision making process. 
Finally, according to the “law and finance” approach (see La
Porta et al., 1996) the difference between financial systems
depends on different corporate governance models, in turn
determined by different legal systems. The most relevant
distinctive element between the two main legal systems, the
Common Law system, peculiar to Anglo-Saxon countries, and the
Civil Law system, peculiar to continental Europe, is the different
degree of protection provided to the shareholders vis-à-vis the
State. This approach suggests that changes in the legal framework
ultimately bear on the evolution of the financial system. It also
highlights the fact that in systems with public companies and
developed capital markets, the monitoring of management should
be less costly and the allocation of resources should be more
efficient. In short, market-oriented financial systems are in general
preferable to bank-oriented ones. 
These last two sentences highlights how much theory can be
far away from reality, even when all sorts of caveats are taken
into account. What the current financial crisis is showing is that
banks and markets where so intertwined that one could not (and,
above all, should not!) have applied the usual conceptual tools.
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Banks were no longer “traditional” but they were deeply involved
in the working of the markets, they were literally “making the
markets”. Even the distinction between developed and
underdeveloped countries and intermediaries had been swept
away by the wave of financial globalization started in the 1990’s.
Beyond the fog of technological and financial complexity, all sorts
of conflicts of interests were flourishing. Monitoring and efficient
allocation were often dismissed under the Common Law system,
in favor of short-term performance and even robbery. Unregulated
non-banking intermediaries are to blame, but often these are
owned by banks or are simply financial vehicles that apparently
regulated banks had put out of the scope of regulators. And how
is it possible that sophisticated regulators did not see or
understand what was going on?
If increasing social complexity and the changing environment
make life hard for the policy maker, they make it even harder for
the economist: some of the essays in this volume provides a much
needed warning on the limit of economic understanding and
economic forecast. What is probably the most effective in this
respect, and the funniest as well, is in De Cecco’s memories of a
conference on socialist financial reform organized with Mario Nuti
in 1987, when in his own words “we did not show much explicit
foreboding of the sudden collapse that was soon to come about”.
No fellow economist should feel immune from such a risk. 
Linked to this third message, this volume provides a last, but
really not least, contribution: it is a real tribute to Domenico Mario
Nuti, not a formal one. As shown by the brief but fascinating
biography in the Introduction, Nuti has always been the kind of
economist conceiving his profession as a mixture of research,
teaching and policy advising, all interacting among them. And the
essays in this collection, connecting economic ideas, history and
living experiences, are the best tribute to his work: food for
thought dedicated to an economic maverick.
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